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This paper addresses the problems older individuals
have been observed to encounter when engaging with
technological artefacts and how such difficulties may
relate to the designers understanding of the normal
cognitive ageing process of human beings. This paper
suggests that these problems may not be the result of
limited cognitive abilities of certain older individuals
but rather the manner in which designers understand the
complex relationship between the mind and actions in
the world. The paper speculates that an alternative
perspective on interactions as affordances that occur
between the embodied individual and their ecology may
benefit design methodologies deployed in creating
engaging technological artefacts for older individuals.
INTRODUCTION
There has been growing discussion within the design
community regarding the response to the ageing
populations of many Western European nations for a
number of years. One subject within this area that has
generated discussion is the effects cognitive changes
have on an older individual’s ability to perform certain
technology-mediated acts, such as using personal
computers, mobile phones and home audio/visual
equipment. Although there appears to be no formal
methodology that designers follow when developing
cognitively inclusive technological artefacts for older
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individuals, there are cases of designers drawing upon
knowledge within psychological disciplines that discuss
cognitive change. This short paper notes that based
upon this knowledge designers may be able to improve
the usability of technological artefacts for certain tasks
but the resulting interactions may not be considered as
novel or engaging.
This paper will briefly overview some of the cognitive
changes psychological disciplines associate with the
normal ageing process of the human brain. These
changes will then be unpacked in relation to the
methods and techniques certain designers have used
when developing new technological artefacts for older
individuals. It will suggest that these methods reduce
the mind to discrete processes for exploitation by the
designer, which might not be productive in the
development of engaging technological interactions for
older individuals. The paper will introduce an
alternative body of evidence based upon theories of
cognition that suggest an individual’s cognitive abilities
are embodied within the capacities of their particular
physiology and enacted within a certain ecology. The
paper will argue that the model of interaction
underpinning these theories determines that engagement
with technological artefacts is a continuous moment-bymoment reassessment of affordances that couple
together the sensorimotor capacities of an individual
and the ecological environment. The paper speculates
that design methodologies relating to the creation of
engaging technological artefacts for older people may
benefit from considering their changing capabilities in
relation to this dynamic model of experience and
interactions as affordances.

1

AGED COGNITIVE ABILITY AND DESIGN
REDUCTIONALISM
Designers have often drawn from the disciplines of
psychology and neuropsychology in order to understand
the changes in the mind as people age, with the
intention of relating such changes to the designed world.
Neuropsychology traditionally studies and identifies
how mental activity relates to certain behaviour, stimuli
and pathologies. Francisco Varela and colleagues
(Varela et al. 1991) argue that such a method is a result
of a long standing notion that treats the mind as an
information processing machine that can be reduced
down to specific processes representing external
phenomena, actions and behavioural traits. In the cases
of older users of technologies, the processes most often
attributed to restricted abilities to engage with emerging
technologies are related to an individual’s memory and
intelligence. Specifically, the areas that relate to
working memory and fluid intelligence are widely
considered as causing the most difficulties (StuartHamilton 2006, Birren and Warner Schaie 2001). These
processes will be briefly explained below.
Working memory is considered the feature of the short
term memory system that allows an individual to not
only keep information in conscious thought for a short
to medium length of time, but to dynamically
manipulate such information. Psychologist Alan
Baddeley claims this is of particular use in activities that
require learning, reasoning and comprehension
(Baddeley 1986). It is widely noted that working
memory declines in older age (Salthouse 1994), along
with the explicit recollection of long term memories
(e.g. Smith 1996). However, certain abilities related to
long term memory, such as implicit knowledge of
previously gained skills and knowledge of words, are
shown to be robust later in life (Smith and Earles 1996).
Raymond Cattell (1971) described fluid intelligence as
the ability one has to decipher new information or
situations without the need to draw upon any prior
experience. This is often opposed to crystallized
Intelligence, which is the coming together of past skills,
experiences and knowledge that may be recalled to be
used once again (Cattell 1971). Various lab studies have
observed a lowering of fluid intelligence later in life and
little change in the crystallized processes (such as
Hayslip and Sterns 1979, Singer et al. 2003). Much as
with the changes observed in studies of memory, this
suggests older individuals are less able to develop the
skills required for certain ‘new’ experiences, yet have a
wealth of previous knowledge that is still accessible.
Some design researchers have noted that the research
within psychological disciplines on ageing intelligence
and memory may be of value to designers of new
technological interfaces. Mary Zajicek identified how
the changes observed in the cognitive abilities of older
people could relate to problems that occur upon the use
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of screen-based computational interfaces, fitting
‘precisely the type of exploratory learning required for
computer use’ (Zajicek 2001, p.2). Zajicek
recommended that certain measures should be taken by
designers of interactive technologies in consideration of
these reduced cognitive abilities, such as simplifying the
functionality of a particular interface by reducing the
amount of information that is required to be stored in
short term memory. Similar conclusions have been
made by a number of HCI and gerontology researchers
over the past decade, often resulting as sets of
guidelines for the usability of new technologies for aged
cognitive ability (such as Schieber 2003).
Other practitioners have attempted to reduce the effects
of the presumed cognitive change by avoiding the use of
the restricted abilities and exploiting the ‘healthy’
processes of memory and intelligence. Milli Docampo
Rama is one such practitioner, investigating the idea
that each generation of certain age ranges belong to
particular generations of technological interaction
(Docampo Rama 2001). Docampo Rama’s research was
based upon a cross-validation between sociological,
psychological and child development research that had
suggested the experiences one has between the ages of
10 and 25 years most strongly shape personal values
and skills used in the future (Sroufe and Cooper,1988,
Glenn 1974). Docampo Rama integrated this argument
with a historical study of technological interfaces
through the 20th century to establish a series of
technology generations that certain generations of
people belong to. It was argued that the integration of
previously gathered knowledge from this earlier period
in an individual’s life harnessed the healthy and able
processes of his or her memory, whilst removing layers
of complexity reduced load on the less able working
memory processes. Tim Lewis (Lewis 2007) and
colleagues have explored Docampo Rama’s claims
further through usability studies of older people using
certain technological products – such as microwaves –
with differing levels of interface generations, from
mechanical-esque to digitised software-based interfaces.
In certain cases design methods derived from
psychological studies of aged cognitive ability can
provide heightened level of ‘usability’. This paper
questions, however, whether a reliance on the past,
metaphor, analogy and a discrete understanding of
memory constitutes the development of novel and
engaging technological interactions for the older
individual. In using the knowledge from the
psychological disciplines the designer becomes a limiter
of potential interactions as opposed to allowing an
engaging reciprocation between an older individual and
the technological artefacts they encounter.
These approaches take the world as a discrete set of
properties that are symbolically stored across the mind
for later retrieval. As such, this leads to designers
adapting cognitive change through identifying which of
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these symbolic representations in the mind work still
and those that do not, and designing technological
artefacts accordingly. An alternative perspective on the
relationship between the mind and actions in the world
that does not observe the mind as an information
processing machine is provided within the embodied
and enactive cognitive sciences.

physiology of an individual, affordances can be
discovered and lost. A branch that affords climbing up
to and swinging on for a child one summer may not the
next. This is a significant feature of the theory of
affordances, as it suggests that the invariant potentials
for interaction are been dynamically continuously
reassessed.

THE ROLE OF BODY AND WORLD

Alva Noë expands upon Gibson’s concept of affordance
to include the ability for an individual to extend and
master their sensorimotor skills, ‘the possession of
which enables a situation to afford an opportunity for
action not otherwise available’ (Noë 2004, p.106). Noë
uses the example of how a baseball bat may afford little
to one individual, but to an individual whom has
mastered the skill or is in the process of doing so, it may
afford the hitting of an appropriate ball a long distance.
This suggests that memory is a dynamic process of the
sensorimotor activity that is in continual change; it does
not merely act as a static store of information to be
referred to but is in a constant fluxation based upon
current and planned action in the world (Edelman
1992).

The perspectives outlined above rely heavily on the idea
that the mind sysmbolically represents certain external
phenomena and treats this as the central ‘computational’
processing device of human consciousness. Opposing
this, embodied models of cognition argue that
perception and cognition result from the physiology of
the whole body (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Gallagher
2005). An embodied perspective on cognition takes the
experience of a particular individual occurring as a
result of the combined sensorimotor capacities (sensory
organs, muscles, bone and skeleton structure etc, and
the actions these allow) that their body provides.
Francisco Varela and colleagues determined that
embodiment unifies the perceptual and action
capabilities of an individual. Perception and action ‘are
fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition. Indeed,
the two are not merely contingently linked in
individuals, they have also evolved together’ (Varela et
al. 1991, pp.172-173). The model of cognition outlined
by this group of researchers suggests that it is no longer
possible to separate the mental processes from actual,
lived experience. Within this body of opinion the
processes of the mind are not a collection of symbollic
representations of an outside world that can be
discretely exploited; the mind is dynamic and fully
intergrated within the actions, interactions and world an
individual finds themselves in (Maturana and Varela
1987).
This argument does not stop at the notion of the mind as
embodied, as this body is situated in a particular world,
or ecology, and is acted, or enacted, within it.
Sensorimotor actions both inform and are informed by
the wider ecological environment an individual is
situated within and the action possibilities it provides
(Abram 1996, Noë 2004, Gibson 1979). James Gibson’s
theory of ecological perception introduced the concept
of affordance (Gibson 1979). Gibson claimed that the
potentiality for interaction in the environment is one of
a mutual conversation between an individual’s
physiology and the objects, surfaces and artefacts that
are perceived at a moment in time (Gibson 1979).
Gibson’s affordances (not be confused with Donald
Norman’s adaptation of the concept (Norman 1999)) are
invariant properties of the environment; an affordance
either exists or it does not. A particular affordance may
not be perceivable to a particular individual as a result
of his or her embodied sensorimotor capabilities,
however, that is not to say the affordance does not exist
for others. As a result of this mutuality with the
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IMPLICATIONS
The current direction of the design of technological
artefacts inclusive of cognitive change in older
individuals draws heavily from Psychological studies of
memory and intelligence. As a result of this, the
designer relies upon a method of distinguishing how the
design of a particular object relates to the reduced
processes of the brain that are considered either healthy
or unhealthy in old age. This creates a situation where
designers have relied heavily on past experience and
simplification of interaction possibilities in order to
restrict the claimed affects of cognitive ageing. Theories
of embodiment and enaction argue that such a
reductionalistic method of understanding action and
interaction in the world ignores the dynamic nature of
the continual reassessment of mutual affordances
between the human sensorimotor capacities and the
environment. It is not as simple as reducing cognition,
history and experience into discrete factors for
investigation, but instead to understand how the
individual is in a constant state of flux unified with the
activity of the body and the broader environment.
For a designer this would require them moving away
from a method that encourages the investigation of the
discrete facets of long term memory and intelligence
and explicitly introducing past meaning and experience
into the technological artefacts they create. Rather, this
alternative perspective may remove evidence of the
designer, developing technological artefacts that allow
for the engagement and interaction with any particular
individual – be they young, old or non-human – based
upon their particular sensorimotor capacity and the
affordances and engagements it allows.
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The brief discussion of embodied and enactive forms of
cognition has not touched upon how this is affected by
certain changes in an individual as they progress
through lifetime. Firstly, this is a result of there being
little to refer to regarding the intersection between the
two subjects – studies of aged cognition, which itself is
an ever growing area of investigation, are still based
upon an information processing model of the mind.
Secondly, it could be speculated that to a proponent of
embodied and enactive cognition ageing as a concept
may not exist; all that is observed is an alternative set of
affordances and mutual couplings between an individual
and the environment. Rather than considering a
particular person as having ‘aged cognitive ability’ as
they no longer reach the standards set by much younger
members of the population, they are just seen as
individuals with certain sensorimotor capacities that
inform their activity in the world.
Some of the difficulties that theories of embodied and
enactive cognition provide for designers is that the
language used by either discipline is not coextensive
with one another. Future research will have to reframe
the terminologies of either field in a manner that is
cohesive and induces collaboration and builds upon
these synergies. This short paper takes a tentative step
towards speculating the usefulness of these models to
designers that are relying more frequently on
psychological disciplines to provide insight into
particular aspects of human behaviour.
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